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AN  ORGANIZATIONAL  ACCOUNT  OF
STATE STANDING
Katherine Mims Crocker*
Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied
itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal
court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants.  Lawsuits chal-
lenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama admin-
istration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in
tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.
Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion?  This Essay argues that
state plaintiffs are far more like at least one other category of so-called “aggregate litigants,”
organizational plaintiffs, than the literature has previously recognized.  In short, one can see
state standing and organizational standing as fitting either side by side (in the sense that state
standing runs parallel to organizational standing) or hand in glove (in the sense that state
standing represents a species of organizational standing).  And a preliminary comparison of
institutional features suggests that state plaintiffs should have at least as strong a claim to
standing in federal court as associational plaintiffs do.
These contentions lead to the conclusion that if the legal community feels comfortable with
the wide scope of organizational standing, it should feel equally—and probably more—comforta-
ble with the wide scope of state standing.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is almost de rigueur for articles on standing to quote Professor
Freund’s testimony to Congress that the concept of standing is ‘among the
most amorphous in the entire domain of public law.’”1  But what matters for
present purposes is that the concept of standing is perhaps no more amor-
phous than when applied to states.  Again and again in regard to recent high-
profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions
about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court.  Con-
troversy and confusion are especially evident in cases where state plaintiffs
seek to sue federal-government defendants.  Lawsuits challenging everything
from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama admin-
istration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans
have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state
plaintiffs belonged in federal court.
Should state standing cause so much hand wringing and head scratch-
ing?  Two aspects of many state-plaintiff suits that seem to engender special
concern are their public-law nature and representational quality.2  But these
features are by no means limited to state-plaintiff suits.  And in any event, the
genies are out of their bottles: public-law litigation and representational
actions are here to stay.3
1 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1988) (quoting Judicial Review: Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm.
on Const. Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966) (statement of
Paul A. Freund)).
2 “[P]ublic law litigation . . . differ[s] in a number of respects from traditional private
law litigation,” in that “[i]t focuses on statutory and constitutional (rather than common-
law) violations, on the wrongs of the defendant more than the injury to the plaintiff, and
on group rather than individual rights”; “deals with polycentric rather than bipolar issues”;
and “tolerates a looser fit between right and remedy.”  Ann Woolhandler & Michael G.
Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 463 (1995) (footnote omitted).  “[P]ublic-law
litigation is often charged with blurring the line between litigation and legislation and with
establishing ongoing regulatory regimes outside the normal lawmaking process.”  Margaret
H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L.
REV. 43, 107 (2018).
3 Critics of public-law litigation point to causes including “Americans’ demand for
justice and distrust of government,” as well as the nation’s “political polarization and fre-
quent bouts of divided government.”  Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 108.  Of course,
“[n]one of these features of American public life are going away anytime soon.” Id.  With
respect to the pervasiveness of representational litigation in the damages context, see
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
557–58 (1996), which mentions, inter alia, class actions, trustee suits for creditors in bank-
ruptcy, state parens patriae litigation, and cases involving estate executors.
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Accordingly, as Professors Margaret Lemos and Ernest Young have
recently written, “[a]n important response to criticisms of state litigation . . .
is to ask” a “largely ignored” question: “[C]ompared to what?”4  As it turns
out, so-called “aggregate litigants” are regularly allowed to accumulate the
interests of individuals or entities in other contexts, like class actions.5  One
kind of aggregate litigant is the organizational plaintiff.6  And “[w]hen states
sue to enforce the Clean Air Act or the securities laws, or to challenge the
[Affordable Care Act] or the Trump travel bans, they are playing a similar
role to the Sierra Club [or] the ACLU.”7
This Essay explores in depth—and with a focus on standing considera-
tions, especially in cases against federal-government defendants—the com-
parison between states and organizations suggested by Lemos and Young’s
wider-ranging article.  The Essay contends, in short, that one can see state
standing and organizational standing as fitting either side by side (in the
sense that state standing runs parallel to organizational standing) or hand in
glove (in the sense that state standing represents a species of associational
standing).  Along the way, the Essay suggests that states compare favorably to
other associations across multiple institutional dimensions related to repre-
sentational capacity.  Consequently, the Essay concludes that the legal com-
munity should feel at least as comfortable with lawsuits led by states as with
lawsuits led by other associations.
This Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the doctrines of state
standing and organizational standing and provides a series of case studies to
which the remainder of the piece refers.  Part II then traces the congruence
between these doctrines.  This discussion touches on—and sometimes sug-
gests doctrinal tweaks for—a number of hot-button issues.  These include the
asserted connection between states’ incidental proprietary injuries and gen-
eralized grievances, the purported problem of manufactured sovereign state
standing, the question whether quasi-sovereign state standing requires citizen
standing, the rule that quasi-sovereign state standing must involve widespread
harm, and the jurisdictional bar that blocks such standing in cases against
federal-government defendants.  The analysis concludes that in light of the
similarities in doctrine and a preliminary comparison of institutional charac-
teristics, state standing should be at least as well accepted, and at least as wide
ranging, as organizational standing is.
I. STATE STANDING AND ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING
Before outlining state standing and organizational standing in particu-
lar, a few words on standing in general are in order.  Standing is supposed to
“identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
4 Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 49, 109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Id. at 109
6 Id.
7 Id. at 49.
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process.”8  The all-too-familiar formulation for the doctrine includes three
elements—an “injury in fact,” a “causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of,” and a “‘likel[ihood]’ . . . that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”9  Other common aspects of standing
doctrine require that plaintiffs assert an injury not shared by too large a pro-
portion of the population and that plaintiffs litigate their own claims rather
than the claims of others.10
Courts generally regard these rules as comprising both “constitutional”
and “prudential” components, with the former deriving from Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement and the latter deriving from “judicial self-
governance” aimed at avoiding matters where resolution by courts would be
unwise or unnecessary.11  As previous scholarship has argued, however, this
framework seems far too facile.  For one thing, the dividing lines between
constitutional and prudential concerns are shadowy and shifting.12  For
another thing, scholars have long debated the fit between current doctrine
and historical understandings of constitutional limitations on the judicial
power, thus casting the contours of “constitutional” standing conditions into
further doubt.13
8 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
9 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
10 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
11 Id. at 500.  In addition, the Supreme Court has recently reclassified a doctrine for-
merly known as “standing” as a matter of statutory interpretation. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014) (declaring that “‘“prudential
standing” is a misnomer’ as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks whether
‘this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute’” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring))).
12 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 853 (2017)
(“[T]he proverbial boundaries dividing ‘self-imposed’ prudential limits, constitutional lim-
its, and statutory limits are often blurred, porous, and contested.”); see also Katherine Mims
Crocker, Essay, A Prudential Take on a Prudential Takings Doctrine, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE
39, 49–51 (2018); Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 153–56, 161–63
(2014).
13 Compare, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 COR-
NELL L. REV. 275, 277 (2008) (“[A]lthough the Court has claimed that its standing require-
ments are necessary to preserve the traditional limits on the judiciary, those requirements
have precluded claims that courts historically would have permitted.”), Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
167 (1992) (arguing that “a revisionist view of Article III, with no textual or historical
support, has established injury in fact as a constitutional prerequisite” to a plaintiff’s suit),
and Winter, supra note 1, at 1374 (“[A] painstaking search of the historical material dem-
onstrates that—for the first 150 years of the Republic—the Framers, the first Congresses,
and the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either that standing is a compo-
nent of the constitutional phrase ‘cases or controversies’ or that it is a prerequisite for
seeking governmental compliance with the law.”), with Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson,
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (“We do not claim
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Reexamining standing rules from first principles, then, is a worthy
endeavor.14  But it is an endeavor that lies beyond the realistic range of this
Essay.  For present purposes, therefore, I treat the general architecture of the
Supreme Court’s standing (and other) jurisprudence as fixed, suggesting
only modest renovations to the particular corners under consideration
here.15
A. State Standing
Questions surrounding the standing of state plaintiffs often focus on the
injury element of the doctrine’s tripartite expression.  According to the
Supreme Court, to provide standing, an injury must constitute the “invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”16  As I have
described elsewhere, caselaw outlines three main categories of interests that
can provide states standing to sue in federal court.17
First are “proprietary” interests.  Often related to a state’s role as prop-
erty owner, these interests are generally economic in nature, and they are
ones that private plaintiffs in the state’s position could also assert.  As the
Supreme Court has observed, “a State is bound to have a variety of proprie-
tary interests,” like “own[ing] land or participat[ing] in a business ven-
ture.”18  And, the Court has explained, “[a]s a proprietor, [a State] is likely
to have the same interests as other similarly situated proprietors” and “may at
times need to pursue those interests in court.”19
that history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court’s vision of standing, or that
the constitutional nature of standing doctrine was crystal clear from the moment of the
Founding on. . . . We do, however, argue that history does not defeat standing doctrine; the
notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a
settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning.”).
14 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1191 (2014) (arguing
that “[c]urrent standing doctrine purports to ask only whether plaintiffs have an adequate
stake in seeking judicial relief” but that in actuality, “the Supreme Court’s standing deci-
sions often turn on a relative assessment of superiority”—and that this approach “serves an
array of values” and “has several advantages over an exclusively adequacy-based
approach”).
15 Of course, dubious aspects of standing doctrine and adjacent issues are relevant to
questions about when and to what extent state standing and organizational standing mat-
ter.  Other scholars have recently undertaken compelling work in such areas. See, e.g.,
Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417
(2017) (regarding the propriety of national injunctions); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One
Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481 (2017) (regarding the propriety of the rule
that only one plaintiff needs to demonstrate standing).
16 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
17 See Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV.
2051, 2055–67 (2011).
18 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
19 Id. at 601–02.
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For a recent—and controversial—example of proprietary state standing
involving federal-government defendants, consider the Texas-led lawsuit
challenging the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program, which
sought to delay deportation for certain immigrants with children who were
American citizens or residents.  The Fifth Circuit held that Texas had stand-
ing to sue because DAPA beneficiaries would have become eligible for
driver’s licenses, which would have cost the State $130.89 each.20  The
Supreme Court affirmed with a tie vote in United States v. Texas.21
Or consider the case in which Hawaii challenged the legality of a Trump-
administration ban against travel to the United States by individuals from
certain predominantly Muslim countries—an issue that the Supreme Court
later addressed in Trump v. Hawaii22 at the Supreme Court.  Citing Texas, the
Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he State’s standing can . . . be grounded in its
proprietary interests as an operator of the University [of Hawaii]” because,
among other things, “students who are unable to attend the University”
because of the travel ban “will not pay tuition.”23
The second category of interests that can provide states standing to sue
in federal court are “sovereign” interests.  These are interests in a state’s
“core ability to govern.”24  The Supreme Court has described them as involv-
ing “the maintenance and recognition of borders,” as well as “the power to
create and enforce a legal code.”25  And scholars have described them as
underlying a state’s suit “to establish its authority to exercise legislative, exec-
utive, or judicial power within a particular territory or over a particular sub-
ject matter.”26  In light of these descriptions, one can think about sovereign
interests as tracking a state’s stake in its jurisdiction, meaning “both (1) the
geographic scope over which a government exercises power and (2) whether
it has authority to do so.”27
20 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
21 136 S. Ct. 2271. The case was decided by an eight-member bench because of the
vacancy associated with Justice Scalia’s death.
22 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
23 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated as moot, 138 S.
Ct. 377 (2017).  Pointing to precedent saying that “[a]t least one plaintiff must have stand-
ing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint,” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2416 (2018) (quoting Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651
(2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Supreme Court avoided the question of
state standing for an Establishment Clause challenge in the travel-ban case by holding that
the individual plaintiffs could premise standing on “the alleged real-world effect that the
[policy] has had in keeping them separated from certain relatives who seek to enter the
country,” id.
24 Crocker, supra note 17, at 2056.
25 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
26 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 411.
27 Crocker, supra note 17, at 2057.
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Border disputes provide obvious examples.  In a case that the Supreme
Court decided in 1838, for instance, Rhode Island sued Massachusetts on the
theory that “the government of Massachusetts, about 1719, wrongfully pos-
sessed herself of a tract of land more southerly than a true line would be
drawn” under a series of seventeenth-century charters tracing back to the
King of England.28  The Court took jurisdiction of the case, notwithstanding
Chief Justice Taney’s argument in dissent that “[c]ontests for rights of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction between states over any particular territory”—as dis-
tinguished from “right[s] of property in the soil of the territory in
controversy”—are “not within the grant of judicial power contained in the
constitution.”29
For an example outside of the border context, see South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach,30 where South Carolina sued the Attorney General of the United
States to invalidate various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  At
bottom, the Act “required States with a long history of discrimination to over-
haul their state election laws.”31  These measures, the Supreme Court sug-
gested by allowing certain theories of the challenge to proceed, inflicted
injury on South Carolina’s sovereign interest in creating and enforcing a
legal code.32
For a failed attempt to attain sovereign state standing, consider an
Obamacare case.  In 2010, the Virginia legislature passed the Virginia Health
Care Freedom Act (VHCFA), which provided that “[n]o resident . . . shall be
required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual [health] insurance cov-
erage.”33  When the Affordable Care Act (ACA) became law, Virginia’s attor-
ney general sued the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services on behalf of the Commonwealth in federal court.  He contended
28 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 679–80 (1838).
29 Id. at 753 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).  Others have argued that treating cases decided
before the middle of the twentieth century as “standing” decisions is somewhat anachronis-
tic. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, State Standing in United States v. Texas: Opening the Flood-
gates to States Challenging the Federal Government, or Proper Federalism?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.
211, 219 (stating that the Supreme Court “did not develop the modern standing doctrine
until the 1940s”).
30 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
31 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851,
871 (2016).
32 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at
492 (“[In Katzenbach,] the Court allowed the state to contest whether Congress could set
voter qualifications in state and federal elections under the Fifteenth Amendment.  Pre-
sumably the state sought to litigate its own liberty interest in setting voter qualifications, as
provided by specific provisions of the Constitution that expressly contemplate state power
to set such qualifications.  By contrast, the Court held that the state could not assert claims
that the Voting Rights Act violated either separation of powers or the Due Process and Bill
of Attainder clauses.  Such provisions, said the Court, protected people rather than
states . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 493 (stating that the Katzenbach Court “presumably
viewed the state[ ] as asserting [its] own constitutional rights—that is, [its] power to make
and apply law concerning participation in elections”).
33 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (West 2018).
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that the ACA’s individual mandate (which, of course, required people “to
obtain or maintain a policy of individual [health] insurance coverage,” in the
words of the VHCFA34) was “unconstitutional [as] exceed[ing] the enumer-
ated powers conferred upon Congress.”35  As for standing, the Attorney Gen-
eral argued that the Commonwealth suffered injury to its sovereign interest
in creating and enforcing a legal code to the extent that the ACA superseded
the VHCFA.36  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument.37  The
court reasoned that because the VHCFA “simply purport[ed] to immunize
Virginia citizens from federal law,” it “reflect[ed] no exercise of ‘sovereign
power.’”38
The third foundation for state standing turns on “quasi-sovereign” inter-
ests, “a judicial construct” that the Supreme Court has acknowledged “does
not lend itself to a simple or exact definition.”39  As the Court stated in the
1982 case Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, quasi-sovereign
interests “consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its
populace.”40  The Court explained that “[a]lthough the articulation of such
interests is a matter for case-by-case development . . . certain characteristics
. . . are so far evident.”41  Quasi-sovereign interests “fall into two general cate-
gories,” the Court said.42  “First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the
health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in gen-
eral.  Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminato-
rily denied its rightful status within the federal system.”43
Fleshing out the first category of quasi-sovereign interests (regarding the
health and well-being of citizens), the Court stated that it had “not attempted
to draw any definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the State
that must be adversely affected by the challenged behavior.”44  And
“[a]lthough more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of
individual residents,” the Court explained, “the indirect effects of the injury
34 Id.
35 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10CV188), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th
Cir. 2011).
36 See Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268.
37 Id. at 269–72.
38 Id. at 270.  I have criticized this decision before. See Crocker, supra note 17, at
2095–99.  But Professor Tara Grove has recently articulated an insightful rationale for it.
See Grove, supra note 31, at 876–80 (explaining the argument that “to the extent a state law
merely declares that private citizens are not subject to legal requirements, and does not
seek to regulate private citizens, that is not sufficient for standing purposes” because “spe-
cial state standing against the federal government is an extension of its ‘special’ standing
against private parties,” which “most reasonably applies only to regulatory, not declaratory,
state laws”).
39 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
40 Id. at 602.
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must be considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.”45  The Court
suggested that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged
injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State stand-
ing to sue . . . is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would
likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”46
As Snapp made clear, public-nuisance actions provide prime examples of
what the Supreme Court now classifies as this type of quasi-sovereign state
standing.47  In one matter that the Court decided in 1901, for instance, Mis-
souri sued Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago for reversing the natu-
ral flow of the Chicago River so that sewage eventually ran into the
Mississippi River in Missouri rather than into Lake Michigan in Illinois.48
The Court stated that “it must surely be conceded that, if the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper
party to represent and defend them.”49
Similarly, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,50 a case that the Supreme
Court decided in 1907, Georgia sued copper companies operating in Tennes-
see for discharging noxious gases across the state line.  The majority opinion
by Justice Holmes declared that “the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.”51  This interest, the Court held, allowed Georgia to seek equitable
relief through the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction.52
Snapp characterized the second category of quasi-sovereign interests as
“ensuring that the State and its residents are not excluded from the benefits
that are to flow from participation in the federal system.”53  One example,
the Court said, was “the State’s interest in the removal of barriers to the par-
ticipation by its residents in the free flow of interstate commerce.”54  Moreo-
ver, the Court said, “federal statutes creating benefits or alleviating hardships




47 See id. at 603–05; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 446 (stating that
“[n]uisance law provided a ready mechanism” for the case-or-controversy requirement to
“evolve[ ] from a traditional private law model to a public law model” because of “its alter-
native incarnations as a government-initiated enforcement suit and as a private action”).
48 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
49 Id. at 241.
50 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
51 Id. at 237.
52 See id. at 237–38.
53 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982).
54 Id.
55 Id.
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To illustrate, Snapp pointed to Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,56 a
case in which Georgia sued railroad companies for transgressing federal anti-
trust laws by conspiring to fix rates to the disadvantage of Georgia shippers.
In deciding that case in 1945, the Supreme Court stated that “Georgia as a
representative of the public is complaining of a wrong which, if proven, limits
the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her develop-
ment, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister
States.”57  The Court declared that “[t]hese are matters of grave public con-
cern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of particular individu-
als who may be affected.”58
Also instructive is Snapp itself.  There, Puerto Rico argued that the
defendants, who were Virginia apple growers and related parties, “discrimi-
nated against Puerto Ricans in favor of foreign laborers” and “denied the
benefits of access to domestic work opportunities that [certain federal stat-
utes] were designed to secure for United States workers.”59  The Court con-
cluded that these allegations fell “within the Commonwealth’s quasi-
sovereign interests” and could thus support standing.60
One note is necessary here.  Courts and commentators often discuss a
concept called “parens patriae” in connection with state standing. Parens
patriae means “parent of his or her country” in Latin, and the term tradition-
ally referred to “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves.”61  Nowadays, the concept can apply in a vari-
ety of contexts, including when Congress provides that states may vindicate
specific statutory rights of their citizens in federal court.62  Most importantly
for the current discussion, however, people often employ the concept as
something like a synonym for quasi-sovereign state standing.63
In sum, the basic outlines of state-standing doctrine hold that there are
three kinds of interests on which the injury element can rest: proprietary
interests, sovereign interests, and quasi-sovereign interests.  Proprietary and
56 Id. (citing Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945)); see also id. at 605–06 (also
discussing Pennsylvania Railroad).
57 Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. at 451.
58 Id.
59 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608.
60 Id.
61 Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Mank, supra note 29, at
217 (“The parens patriae doctrine originated as an English common law doctrine concern-
ing the authority of the English King to protect incompetent persons . . . .”).
62 See Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 68 & n.110 (describing how “provisions of
federal law” can “facilitate[ ] state litigation by authorizing state [attorneys general] to
enforce federal statutes, often by suing as parens patriae to protect the rights of state
citizens”).
63 E.g., Mank, supra note 29, at 217 (“Beginning in the early twentieth century, the
Supreme Court recognized that states may sue in their capacity as parens patriae to protect
quasi-sovereign interests in the health, welfare, and natural resources of state citizens.”); see
Grove, supra note 31, at 865 (describing the synonymous relationship between the con-
cepts); Crocker, supra note 17, at 2072–74 (same).
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sovereign interests lead to direct state standing, in the sense that they are
held by states qua states.  Quasi-sovereign interests create representational
state standing, in the sense that they are held by states as caretakers of their
citizens.
B. Organizational Standing
The point of this Essay is to provide a comparative view of state standing
and organizational standing.  The typical typology for the latter, which is
sometimes also called “associational standing,” includes two threads.  First,
the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]here is no question that an association
may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself
and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may
enjoy.”64  Second, “an association may have standing solely as the representa-
tive of its members.”65
The first thread—in which an association sues “in its own right”—divides
into two distinct strands.  Illustrative of both is Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,66 which the Supreme Court decided
in 1977.  In Arlington Heights, a religious order sought to sell a tract of land in
a Chicago suburb with a predominantly white population to a nonprofit
development corporation that “several prominent Chicago citizens” had
founded “for the purpose of building low- and moderate-income housing
throughout the Chicago area.”67  The religious order and the developer
entered into a conditional sale agreement, which would lapse if the local
government refused to rezone the tract from single-family use to multiple-
family use.68  The local government did so refuse, and the developer sued,
alleging that the denial of its rezoning request was racially discriminatory and
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act.69
The Supreme Court upheld the developer’s standing on two grounds.
As an initial matter, the Court said, the developer had suffered an “economic
injury” because it had “expended thousands of dollars on the plans for [the
community] and on the studies submitted . . . in support of the petition for
rezoning.”70  In any event, “economic injury is not the only kind of injury
that can support a plaintiff’s standing,” the Court continued, and the devel-
oper had also suffered a cognizable injury to its “interest in making suitable
low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce.”71  The fact
that the developer intended to build a particular project provided “that
64 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
65 Id.
66 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
67 Id. at 255–56.
68 Id. at 256–57.
69 Id. at 254.
70 Id. at 262.
71 Id. at 262–63.
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‘essential dimension of specificity’ that informs judicial decisionmaking,” the
Court concluded.72
Arlington Heights, therefore, outlined two kinds of direct standing that an
association can pursue: standing based on injury to its economic interests
and standing based on injury to what one could call its “missional” inter-
ests.73  The dominant understanding of the missional variety comes from a
case that the Supreme Court decided a few years later, Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman.74  There, a nonprofit membership corporation whose purpose,
according to the complaint, was “to make equal opportunity in housing a
reality in the Richmond Metropolitan Area” sued the owner of an apartment
complex in a Virginia suburb.75  The association alleged that the owner had
violated the Fair Housing Act by engaging in “racial steering”—“a ‘practice
by which real estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns of
racial segregation in available housing’” through directing individuals toward
particular communities based on race.76
The Supreme Court held that “[i]f, as broadly alleged, petitioners’ steer-
ing practices have perceptibly impaired [the corporation’s] ability to provide
counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers,
there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact”
sufficient to confer standing.77  The Court concluded that “[s]uch concrete
and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the conse-
quent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than sim-
ply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”78
As outlined above, an association can also assert standing “solely as the
representative of its members.”79  The Supreme Court stated the canonical
test for representational organizational standing in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission.80  North Carolina had passed a law requiring
that certain apples show “no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or
standard.”81  The Washington State Apple Advertising Commission objected
on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against inter-
state commerce by prohibiting the display of Washington apple grades.82
72 Id. at 263 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
221 (1974)).
73 Indeed, one author has labeled the latter kind of direct standing “mission advance-
ment standing.”  Ryan Baasch, Essay, Reorganizing Organizational Standing, 103 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 18, 19 (2017).
74 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
75 Id. at 368.
76 Id. at 366–67, 366 n.1 (quoting Joint Appendix at 12, Havens, 455 U.S. 363 (No. 80-
988)).
77 Id. at 379.
78 Id.
79 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
80 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
81 Id. at 335 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 106-189.1 (1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
82 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL508.txt unknown Seq: 13 18-JUL-19 10:18
2019] organizational  account 2069
Summarizing precedent, the Court explained that “an association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members” when three conditions are
met: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”83
The Court held these prerequisites satisfied in Hunt.  The Court rea-
soned (a) that the North Carolina statute had brought about injury to Wash-
ington apple growers and dealers by causing them to alter their packaging
practices or lose accounts; (b) that “the Commission’s attempt to remedy
these injuries and to secure the industry’s right to publicize its grading sys-
tem” was “central to [its] purpose of protecting and enhancing the market
for Washington apples”; and (c) that “neither the interstate commerce claim
nor the request for declaratory and injunctive relief requires individualized
proof and both are thus properly resolved in a group context.”84
In sum, there are three rubrics under which an association can claim
standing to act as a plaintiff in federal court.  The first and second forms of
organizational standing involve direct injury, with one turning on harm to an
association’s economic interests and the other turning on harm to its mis-
sional interests.  The third form of organizational standing involves represen-
tational injury and turns on harm to members’ interests in connection with
the association’s purpose.
II. STATE STANDING ALONGSIDE ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING
Judges and observers often see state standing as a strange and suspect
doctrine—especially (but not exclusively) when it comes to quasi-sovereign
injury and suits against federal-government defendants.85  In fact, however,
the standards for attaining state standing and the standards for attaining
organizational standing are nearly identical.
83 Id. at 343 (citing Warth, 442 U.S. at 515).
84 Id. at 343–44.
85 With respect to quasi-sovereign injury and federal-government defendants, see, for
example, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissent-
ing), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).  Judge King argued
that “[b]y relaxing standing for state suits against the federal government, we risk trans-
forming ourselves into ‘ombudsmen of the administrative bureaucracy, a role for which
[we] are ill-suited both institutionally and as a matter of democratic theory.’” Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting John G. Roberts, Jr., Comment, Article III Limits on Statutory
Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1232 (1993)).  With respect to quasi-sovereign injury, see, for
example, Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1851 (2000).  Pro-
fessor Ratliff asserts that “quasi-sovereign” is “a meaningless term absolutely bereft of util-
ity” and “one of those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that
appellate courts sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether.” Id.  And with
respect to federal-government defendants, see, for example, Grove, supra note 31, at 882 &
n.161.  Grove collects sources for the proposition that “[a] number of scholars . . . oppose
state standing to protect state law against federal interference.” Id.
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The basic outlines of the category-level congruence between state stand-
ing and organizational standing may be discernible by this point.  Both doc-
trines come in three flavors, with two requiring direct harm to the plaintiff
itself and one requiring representational harm to the plaintiff’s constituents.
In each instance, moreover, one of the direct forms of standing generally
depends on what one could think of as quantitative harm to the plaintiff’s
economic interests, while the other direct form depends on what one could
think of as qualitative harm to the plaintiff’s foundational character (fuzzy as
that formulation may be).
As a descriptive matter, the aim here is to explain this doctrinal similarity
(and to examine any differences).  On a normative level, the aim here is to
explore institutional features of states and associations that may affect their
aptitudes for leading representational litigation.  The more modest version
of my argument is that one can see state standing and organizational stand-
ing as so similar that there is little reason to view state plaintiffs with any
special skepticism.  The less modest version of my argument is that one can
actually see state standing as a variant of organizational standing, so that if
the latter is legitimate, the former is too.  While advancing these claims, I
examine several hot topics from recent state suits against federal-government
defendants, including incidental proprietary injuries, manufactured sover-
eign standing, and a controversial jurisdictional bar from the quasi-sovereign
context.
A. Proprietary State Standing
Proprietary state standing is essentially identical to economic organiza-
tional standing, the first kind of direct standing discussed in Arlington Heights.
Caselaw makes clear that both require the same type of property-based injury
that any other litigant can assert, and the transitive property of equality tells
us that if A = B and B = C, then A = C.  As the Supreme Court stated in Snapp,
“like other associations and private parties, a State is bound to have a variety of
proprietary interests,” and “like other such proprietors it may at times need
to pursue those interests in court.”86
One possible limitation on proprietary state standing bears noting, how-
ever.  In Texas’s DAPA challenge, the Obama administration attacked the
State’s assertion of proprietary injury on the ground that it was “incidental”—
meaning that the injury was caused not by a federal-government decision
concerning Texas itself, but rather by a federal-government decision con-
cerning other parties, which caused ripple effects for the State’s fiscal costs.87
“If States could establish standing on the basis of the indirect effects of fed-
86 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 (1982)
(emphasis added).
87 Brief for the Petitioners at 20–22, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(No. 15-674).
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eral policy choices . . . , federal courts would be drawn into all manner of
generalized grievances,” the U.S. Solicitor General argued.88
The primary problem with the Solicitor General’s argument is not that it
took a skeptical stance toward incidental injuries.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s most canonical standing case, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,89 says that
when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at
issue, . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has
caused him injury”—but that “when the plaintiff is not himself the object of
the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”90
Instead, the primary problem with the Solicitor General’s argument is
that it effectively sought to subject states to more rigorous standing require-
ments than those that other litigants face.  A “generalized grievance” is not
an injury shared by all members of some discrete category of potential plain-
tiffs—here, all fifty states.  A generalized grievance is an injury shared by (to
quote the Supreme Court in a litany of cases91) “every citizen”92 or at least
“the great body of . . . citizens,”93 “people generally,”94 or (perhaps the most
frequent formulation) “all members of the public.”95  Setting aside issues of
incidentalness, an injury can provide (“constitutional”) standing so long as
the injury is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”—as
Texas’s license-related injury appeared to be.96  The law is clear, after all,
88 Id. at 21.
89 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
90 Id. at 561–62 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)); see also Aziz Z.
Huq, State Standing’s Uncertain Stakes, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2127, 2141 (2019) (discussing
how “state efforts to challenge other jurisdictions’ actions based on allegations of fiscal
impact have been divisive” more generally).
91 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–41 (2007) (per curiam) (collecting these
quotations).
92 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
93 Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900).
94 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
95 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)
(per curiam).  Some cases even limit the concept to “suits ‘claiming only harm to [the
plaintiff’s] and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws.’”
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573); see Richard M. Re, The Rule Against Just
One Generalized Grievance, RE’S JUDICATA (Oct. 2, 2014), https://richardresjudicata.word
press.com/2014/10/02/the-rule-against-just-one-generalized-grievance/ (discussing this
phenomenon).
96 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  To be clear, I do not mean that Texas’s
license-related costs necessarily provided it standing, only that they seem to have satisfied
the basic injury-in-fact test. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State
Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2015, 2024 (2019) (suggesting that Texas’s license-
related costs constituted a “real injur[y]” for purposes of the “injury-in-fact” standard).
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that “[f]or standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordi-
narily an ‘injury.’”97
Accordingly, the fact that states’ proprietary interests are so diffuse that a
host of federal-government actions could cause them injuries does not make
those injuries generalized grievances.  As a doctrinal matter, at least, states
should be able to vindicate their proprietary interests through litigation in
federal court to the same extent that other litigants can.
B. Sovereign State Standing
How does sovereign state standing align with organizational standing?
Recall that in Havens, the Supreme Court recognized a form of organiza-
tional standing where the defendant’s conduct has “perceptibly impaired”
the plaintiff’s missional activities, with a “consequent drain on the organiza-
tion’s resources.”98  As it turns out, sovereign state standing looks a lot like
missional organizational standing.
Start with the first element of the Havens test.  The interests that Snapp
identified as sovereign—“the maintenance and recognition of borders” and
“the power to create and enforce a legal code”99—are surely integral ingredi-
ents of a state’s “mission,” whatever the metaphysical boundaries of that con-
cept might be.
Thinking through the second element of the Havens test, which relates
to the investment of resources, is a little trickier.  Consider a classic border
dispute: Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.100  As the Supreme Court wrote in
1838, the disagreement between the State and the Commonwealth had been
ongoing since “a very early period,” with commissioners “appointed by each
colony in 1709, and at various other periods down to 1809.”101  In the early
eighteenth century, the Court said, the commissioners reached an agreement
“that a line should be run and marked as the[ ] boundary, which was
done.”102  More specifically, the Court continued, “a survey [was] made and
returned” and sent “to the legislatures of the respective colonies,” where it
was “accepted by Massachusetts, but . . . not accepted and ratified by Rhode
Island.”103  That Rhode Island had suffered a “drain on [its] resources” by
the time that it sued Massachusetts in 1832 seems beyond doubt.104  And it
stands to reason that border disputes often involve a similar intensity of preli-
tigation negotiation and expenditure on the part of state plaintiffs.
97 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (citing McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1961) (finding standing for parties who faced a fine of
five dollars plus costs)).
98 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
99 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
100 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
101 Id. at 714–15.
102 Id. at 715.
103 Id.
104 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
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Now consider a case presenting a classic injury to a state’s lawmaking
prerogatives: Katzenbach, which “required” some states to “overhaul” their
election regimes.105  An enormous amount of resources go into the legisla-
tive infrastructure that supports law creation, of course, and the same is true
of the administrative apparatus that sustains law enforcement.106
But what about more exotic assertions of sovereign injury, like Virginia’s
argument based on enacting the VHCFA in the shadow of the ACA’s individ-
ual mandate?  Judges and commentators have criticized squishy applications
of missional organizational standing because of the possibility that some pub-
lic-interest associations could manufacture the ability to sue whenever they
want.107  Indeed, skepticism about “[s]ynthetic standing”108 explains why
courts generally disregard expenditures that organizations have made pursu-
ing the litigation under consideration109—and why some judges have advo-
cated shoring up the resource-investment element even further.110
So one response to questions concerning supposedly manufactured
instances of sovereign state standing (which appear to be few and far
between111) is that courts could recognize guardrails similar to those that
restrain missional organizational standing.  For her part, Professor Tara
Grove has offered a forceful argument that “to the extent a state law”—like
the VHCFA—“merely declares that private citizens are not subject to legal
requirements, and does not seek to regulate private citizens, that is not suffi-
cient for standing purposes.”112  An alternative response is that states paid
the price to vindicate the full range of their sovereign interests in federal
court by agreeing to the constitutional plan.  In what has become known as
105 Grove, supra note 31, at 871.
106 See Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
1065, 1066 & n.10 (1982) (“Enormous resources have been given to law enforcement to
prevent, fight, and detect crime.”); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures
of the Criminal Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1367 (2008)
(“Passing legislation is expensive and time-consuming.”).
107 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay,
868 F.3d 104, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opin-
ion for allowing standing based on “purported organizational injury that is speculative and
generalized, and—to the extent that it exists—both elective and negligible”); Baasch, supra
note 73, at 19.
108 Centro de la Comunidad Hispana, 868 F.3d at 121 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g., Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (“An organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a
suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit.” (quoting Spann v. Colonial Vill.,
Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1225–27 (9th
Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that circuit precedent “has
drifted away from the requirement that an organization actually suffer an injury” by hold-
ing “that an organization with a social interest in advancing enforcement of a law was
injured when the organization spent money enforcing that law”).
111 See Crocker, supra note 17, at 2100.
112 See Grove, supra note 31, at 877; see also id. at 876–80 (developing this argument).
But see Huq, supra note 90, at 2145–46 (disputing Grove’s point).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL508.txt unknown Seq: 18 18-JUL-19 10:18
2074 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
the “sovereignty-ceding rationale,”113 Justice Holmes observed in Tennessee
Copper, for example, that “[w]hen the states by their union made the forcible
abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby
agree to submit to whatever might be done.”114  Rather, Holmes reasoned
(regarding original jurisdiction but with logic also applicable to standing doc-
trine) that as an “alternative to force,” the states accepted the ability to bring
“a suit in this court.”115
For all these reasons, the doctrine surrounding sovereign state standing
fits well with, or even within, the doctrine surrounding missional organiza-
tional standing.
C. Quasi-Sovereign State Standing
Now, how does quasi-sovereign state standing relate to organizational
standing?  Recall that in Hunt, the Supreme Court established that “an associ-
ation has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members” when three factors
are present: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organiza-
tion’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”116  In many
or maybe even most cases, it appears that a state that could premise standing
on quasi-sovereign injury could also satisfy these conditions for representa-
tional organizational (or “associational”) standing.
1. Constituent Standing
Examining the connection between quasi-sovereign state standing and
the first Hunt factor (regarding whether an organization’s “members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”) raises two subsidiary ques-
tions.  First, how do a state’s citizens and an association’s members—that is,
the entities’ constituents—compare?  Second, does the citizen-harm compo-
nent of quasi-sovereign state standing mean that such constituents have
standing to sue in their own right, as required for representational organiza-
tional standing?
Hunt itself is relevant to the initial question, for the Supreme Court spe-
cifically addressed whether a public body could qualify for representational
organizational standing.  The plaintiff there, the Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission, was a state agency “charged with the statutory duty
113 Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public
Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 803–04 (2009) (discussing the provenance of this
principle).
114 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
115 Id.; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 450–51 (stating that Justice
Holmes “[r]eviv[ed] an argument from the boundary cases” by “conceiv[ing] of state-as-
party suits as substitutes for the use of force or diplomacy—as an alternative avenue for the
exercise of state power” (footnote omitted)).
116 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
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of promoting and protecting [Washington’s] apple industry.”117  Pursuant to
the state code, the commission was “composed of 13 Washington apple grow-
ers and dealers” who were “nominated and elected within electoral districts
by their fellow growers and dealers.”118  The commission’s activities included
“the promotion of Washington apples in both domestic and foreign markets
through advertising, market research and analysis, and public education, as
well as scientific research into the uses, development, and improvement of
apples.”119  These activities were “financed entirely by assessments levied
upon the apple industry” and were “initially fixed by statute.”120
“The prerequisites to ‘associational standing’” were “clearly present,” the
Court said.121  So the “only question” was whether the commission’s “status
as a state agency, rather than a traditional voluntary membership organiza-
tion,” prevented it from asserting claims on behalf of “the Washington apple
growers and dealers who form its constituency.”122  The answer was no, the
Court concluded, because “for all practical purposes,” the commission “per-
form[ed] the functions of a traditional trade association.”123
Drawing from Hunt and circuit precedent, one lower court has
explained that “[t]hree main characteristics must be present” for “an organi-
zation with no formal members” to claim representational organizational
standing as “the functional equivalent of a traditional membership organiza-
tion.”124  These are (1) that the organization “serve[s] a specialized segment
of the community”; (2) that the organization “represent[s] individuals that
have all the ‘indicia of membership’ including (i) electing the entity’s leader-
ship[,] (ii) serving in the entity, and (iii) financing the entity’s activities”; and
(3) that the organization’s “fortunes” are “tied closely to those of its
constituency.”125
States present each of these features.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that
Snapp grouped states together with “other associations” when discussing stand-
ing.126  States serve their citizens, who constitute a “specialized segment” of
the national community.  Citizens have all the “indicia of membership” out-
lined above.  They elect the state’s leadership, serve in its government, and
finance its activities.  And it almost goes without saying that a state’s “for-
tunes” are “tied closely” to those of its citizens, whose property makes up a
large proportion of the tax base.  To quote Hunt, “[i]n a very real sense,” a
117 Id. at 336–37.
118 Id. at 337.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 343.
122 Id. at 344.
123 Id.
124 Basel Action Network v. Mar. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D.D.C. 2005) (quot-
ing Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
125 Id. (quoting Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 26).
126 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL508.txt unknown Seq: 20 18-JUL-19 10:18
2076 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
state “provides the means by which” its citizens “express their collective views
and protect their collective interests.”127
Some courts have declined to extend representational organizational
standing to municipalities, largely on the ground that municipalities “do[ ]
not have ‘members’ who have voluntarily associated.”128  One could argue
that states are unlike associations when it comes to standing for the same
reason.  But that line of logic would seem mistaken.  For one thing, Hunt
refused to “find it significant . . . that ‘membership’ [was] ‘compelled’ in the
form of mandatory assessments.”129  As the Court explained: “Membership in
a union, or its equivalent, is often required.  Likewise, membership in a bar
association . . . is often a prerequisite to the practice of law.  Yet in neither
instance would it be reasonable to suggest that such an organization lacked
standing to assert the claims of its constituents.”130
For another (although far more tentative) thing, people do “voluntarily
associate[ ]” in municipalities and states, at least to some extent.  An “associa-
tion” is a “gathering of people for a common purpose” or “the persons so
joined.”131  Some people gather “for a common purpose” when choosing
where to reside.  Many individuals select localities based on factors like the
strength of the technology sector or the diversity of religious viewpoints.  And
these are exactly the kinds of shared interests that private associations seek to
advance.  Certain people even decide where to call home with the goal of
banding together with others who take the same positions on the types of
policy priorities that state plaintiffs often seek to vindicate in suits against
federal-government defendants, including on issues like immigration and
environmental regulation.132  Questions surrounding the so-called “Big
Sort”—the hypothesis that there is an “intensif[ying]” trend of Americans
“cluster[ing] into Democratic- and Republican-preferring communities”133—
have swirled in the social-science literature for several years.134  But what
matters is that regardless of the extent to which people pick states based on
political purposes, it is fair to think that they sometimes pick states based on
common purposes.
127 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
128 City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Coldsprings
Township v. Kalkaska Cty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 755 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008); see generally Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 59 (2014).
129 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
130 Id.
131 Association, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
132 See Emily Badger, Political Migration: A New Business of Moving Out to Fit In, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/upshot/political-migra-
tion-a-new-business-of-moving-out-to-fit-in.html.
133 Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1267–68 (2016).
134 See Jesse Sussell, New Support for the Big Sort Hypothesis: An Assessment of Partisan Geo-
graphic Sorting in California, 1992–2010, 46 POL. SCI. & POL. 768 (2013).
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One could also think of any given state-government election as a “gath-
ering of people for a common purpose.”  During elections, citizens come
together to express and effectuate their ideologies and interests by voting
into office leaders who will pursue policies consistent with their values.  This
includes those leaders (usually attorneys general, who are elected in the vast
majority of states135) who can advance such policies through affirmative liti-
gation.  As Grove has observed, “it is unsurprising that . . . the Texas attorney
general focused on federal immigration law” in the DAPA challenge, for
example.136  After all, “state attorneys general have strong political incentives
to respond to the preferences of state constituents,” and “the existing
research suggests that state attorneys general often bring lawsuits that are
likely to curry favor with state voters.”137  The Supreme Court has character-
ized the primary goal of organizational-standing doctrine as allowing people
who seek “to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they
share with others” to act in a collective manner by filing suit in federal
court.138  As mediated by state-government elections, state standing can theo-
retically achieve the same objective.
This analogy is obviously imperfect.  The alignment of interests between
members of an association formed to pursue a specific cause will often be
stronger than the alignment of interests between citizens of a state formed
largely to reflect long-ago geopolitical considerations, and elections do little
to smooth over divergent values.  In addition, Americans residing domesti-
cally must live in some state (or an effectively equivalent entity), and the anal-
ogy surely overstates people’s mobility for a host of reasons.  Relatedly, exit is
usually far less costly from an association than from a state.  But these differ-
ences (like others between states in particular and organizations in general)
are differences of degree rather than of kind.  And because they are also
generalizations, there is overlap between states and organizations even on
these fronts.  Consider an example to which the Supreme Court’s own orga-
nizational-standing jurisprudence points: bar associations.  Many bar associa-
tions represent all manner of attorneys, from prosecutors to public
defenders, from plaintiffs’ lawyers to defense specialists, and from corporate
lobbyists to nonprofit advocates.  While these attorneys probably share cer-
tain core concerns, their overall alignment of interests seems relatively weak.
Some bar associations are effectively mandatory for some people.  And exit-
ing such an association can come at a steep cost: the ability legally to practice
law in the pertinent jurisdiction.
So a state’s citizens and an association’s members match up relatively
well in relevant ways.  That leads to the second subsidiary question men-
tioned above, regarding whether the citizen-harm component of quasi-sover-
135 As of 2006, attorneys general were apparently elected in forty-three states.  William
P. Marshall, Essay, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006).
136 Grove, supra note 31, at 898.
137 Id. at 897 & n.223 (collecting sources).
138 UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986).
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eign state standing means that citizens have standing to sue in their own
right, as required for representational organizational standing.  The short
answer is that reasonable minds differ on whether quasi-sovereign state stand-
ing demands citizen standing.
Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, has argued in the affirmative (joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).  In Massachusetts v. EPA,139 Massachu-
setts challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision not to
address global warming—and, in particular, rising sea levels—by regulating
motor-vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion held that Massachusetts had standing to
sue but was hazy on how,140 suggesting that the Commonwealth could claim
injuries to proprietary interests, sovereign interests, and quasi-sovereign
interests.141  In dissent, Roberts disagreed.  Writing for the Court’s four most
conservative members, he argued that Massachusetts had failed to assert a
sufficient injury to any cognizable interest, in part because the alleged loss of
coastal land was neither particularized, actual, nor imminent.142  And of spe-
cial pertinence here, Roberts argued that “[j]ust as an association suing on
behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members but
that at least one satisfies Article III requirements, so too a State asserting
quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy
Article III.”143
On the opposite side of the issue stands, for example, the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (AEP).144  In AEP,
Connecticut and others sued operators of fossil fuel–fired power plants for
public nuisance, seeking a cap on their carbon dioxide emissions.  In holding
that Connecticut had quasi-sovereign state standing, the Second Circuit
rejected the argument that “for states to sue in their parens patriae capacity,
the citizens that the states seek to protect must themselves satisfy Article III’s
core requirements.”145
139 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
140 See Huq, supra note 90, at 2139 n.75 (“It is hard to make much of the Massachusetts
v. EPA decision . . . given the plurality of fragmentary theories of standing in evidence
there.” (citing Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 40 (2011)).
141 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (proprietary interests: stating that “[b]ecause the
Commonwealth ‘owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,’ it has alleged a
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner” (quoting an affidavit)); id. at 519 (sov-
ereign interests: stating that “Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign
territory” “supported federal jurisdiction”); id. at 520 (quasi-sovereign interests: stating
that “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests” helped sustain the
suit).
142 See id. at 538–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 538.
144 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
145 Id. at 338–39.  Of note, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in AEP but divided
equally on the question of standing (with Justice Sotomayor recusing because she partici-
pated in the case below). See AEP, 564 U.S. at 420, 429; AEP, 582 F.3d at 314 n.*.  Four
Justices would have held that “at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massa-
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Even if citizen standing is not necessary for quasi-sovereign state stand-
ing, what matters most for present purposes is that the two often—and per-
haps overwhelmingly—go hand in hand.  Consider Snapp as an example.
The complaint alleged that the defendants had “fail[ed] to provide employ-
ment for qualified Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers,” had “subject[ed]
those Puerto Rican workers that were employed to working conditions more
burdensome than those established for temporary foreign workers,” and had
“improperly terminat[ed] employment of Puerto Rican workers.”146  Those
allegations should easily have provided the workers themselves standing to
sue.
Or return to AEP.  In addition to finding state standing, the Second Cir-
cuit held that three nonprofit land trusts had established standing by alleg-
ing, among other things, that rising sea levels from global warming “will
‘permanently inundate some low-lying property along coasts and tidal rivers,
including property that [they] own or on which they hold conservation ease-
ments’ and will salinize marshes on their properties, destroying fish and
migratory bird habitats.”147  The fact that certain large landowners had suf-
fered sufficient injury indicates that citizen standing was available.
In short, there is good reason to think that many or most cases present-
ing quasi-sovereign state standing also present citizen standing.148  And that
makes sense.  The first “general categor[y]” of interests that Snapp said could
give rise to quasi-sovereign standing requires “injury to the health and wel-
fare of [a state’s] citizens.”149  And the two examples that the Court offered to
illustrate the second “general categor[y]” involved “the removal of barriers to
the participation by [a state’s] residents in the free flow of interstate com-
merce” and the accrual “to [a state’s] residents” of interests flowing from “fed-
eral statutes creating benefits or alleviating hardships.”150  Those
circumstances should all commonly produce cognizable injuries for the indi-
viduals at issue.
Nevertheless, one clear difference that makes quasi-sovereign state
standing narrower than representational organizational standing bears evalu-
ating here.  While “more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group
of individual residents” for (at least the first kind of) quasi-sovereign state
standing,151 injury to “any one” member is adequate for representational
chusetts.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 420.  But four Justices would have held that “none of the plain-
tiffs have Article III standing,” either because they adhered to Roberts’s Massachusetts
dissent or because they believed that Massachusetts was distinguishable. Id.  Without creat-
ing binding precedent, the Court thus affirmed the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Id.
146 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 598 (1982).
147 AEP, 582 F.3d at 342 (quoting the trusts’ complaint).
148 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 512 (“The parens patriae label . . . often
merely dresses up actions that private parties could easily bring.”).
149 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 608 (emphases added).
151 Id. at 607.
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associational standing.152  Indeed, to attain standing on a quasi-sovereign
basis, a state must “allege[ ] injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its
population,”153 whatever that means.  Current doctrine thus “erect[s] a hur-
dle” to state standing “that private organizations need not overcome.”154
As Lemos and Young have pointed out, this hurdle is less sensical than it
may seem, given that “[m]any national organizations that frequently file
claims in federal court are comparable in size to the states.”155  The Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons has nearly 38 million members, for
instance, which approximately matches the population of California.156  And
the Sierra Club has 3.5 million members, putting it around the size of Con-
necticut or Iowa.157
It is easy to imagine circumstances, moreover, where a state could have
an intense interest in fighting the mistreatment of even a single citizen (espe-
cially by a noncitizen).  What if only a handful of Missourians had consumed
water from the Mississippi River by the time that their state sued Illinois and
the City of Chicago in 1900 for directing an upstream source toward Missouri
itself?  What if only one Puerto Rican had sought to secure employment har-
vesting apples in Virginia before his territory sued growers in 1979 for dis-
criminating against him precisely because of his Puerto Rican background?
Should the law have seen these injuries as any less worthy of protection
through state-plaintiff or territory-plaintiff litigation?  The dignitary harms to
Missouri and Puerto Rico would hardly have been any less acute.158
At bottom, regardless of whether quasi-sovereign state standing actually
requires constituent standing (as representational organizational standing
does), quasi-sovereign state standing regularly involves constituent standing.
So with respect to the first Hunt factor, quasi-sovereign state standing at least
approximates representational organizational standing.
2. Germaneness to Purpose
Now consider the second Hunt factor for representational organiza-
tional standing—that “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose.”159  This factor has been interpreted leniently, with
152 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
153 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
154 Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 112.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 112 & n.317.
157 Id. at 112.
158 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 450 (arguing that “the nuisance suits,
and related water rights cases, . . . were generally brought to protect state resources” and
“could therefore be characterized as modest extensions of ones in which the [Supreme]
Court allowed the state to sue to vindicate its more individualized ‘proprietary’ interests”
(footnote omitted)).
159 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
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multiple courts of appeals describing it as “undemanding.”160  Courts thus
allow associational plaintiffs to characterize their purposes capaciously161
and regularly require that cases bear only a minimal connection to those
purposes.162
Pondering the “purpose” of a state in the American constitutional system
leads down a path of high political theory.  But the interests that Snapp
placed under the umbrella of quasi-sovereignty would appear germane.  As
for the first category, the Court explained that
[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the
health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as
parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would
likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.163
Protecting health and welfare through sovereign lawmaking powers—in
essence, the use of police powers164—seems as fundamental to a state’s rea-
son for being as any other formulation.  Indeed, state constitutions regularly
characterize protecting health and welfare as an essential purpose of the gov-
ernment’s existence.165
160 Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 627 F.3d 547, 550 n.2
(5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d
138, 148 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l
Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v.
Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 See, e.g., Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulations, Inc. v. Olsen, No.
2:08-cv-00875, 2009 WL 5175202, at *6 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2009) (“The perhaps ill-defined
or amorphous nature of the membership, complained of by Defendant, does not over-
come the fact that the membership has at least one discrete and common purpose—advo-
cating for reasonable fundraising regulation . . . .”).
162 See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 448 F.3d at 148 (“We think it significant that
the Hunt Court used the word ‘germane,’ rather than the phrase ‘at the core of,’ or ‘cen-
tral to,’ or some word or phrase indicating the need for a closer nexus between the inter-
ests sought to be protected by the suit in question and the organization’s dominant
purpose.”); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (per curiam) (“[T]he germaneness test is relatively loose.  As recently construed by
this court, it requires ‘mere pertinence between litigation subject and organizational pur-
pose.’” (quoting Humane Soc’y, 840 F.2d at 58)).
163 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
164 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm’rs, 200 U.S.
561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a State embraces regulations designed
to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations
designed to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”); see also
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 451 (“In the nuisance suits, the Court . . . saw the
government’s litigable interest as deriving not merely from common-law proprietary inter-
ests but also from the state’s ‘police power’ to regulate property for the public good.”); id.
at 475 ([“Parens patriae standing] was a variant of police power standing, by which govern-
mental power to promote the general welfare found an outlet in federal litigation rather
than in state legislation and home-court enforcement.”).
165 See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating that “all free governments are, and of right
ought to be, . . . instituted for [the people’s] peace, safety, and well-being”); VA. CONST. art.
I, § 3 (stating that the “purposes” for which the government “is, or ought to be, instituted”
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The second category of quasi-sovereign interests that Snapp identified
involves a state’s stake “in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status
within the federal system.”166  The Court illustrated this category with two
examples: (1) a state’s interests in “the removal of barriers to the participa-
tion by its residents in the free flow of interstate commerce” and (2) a state’s
interests in “federal statutes creating benefits or alleviating hardships” where
such interests could “accrue to its residents.”167  One could credibly charac-
terize the enforcement of federalism-based barriers and benefits on behalf of
the population as germane to the purpose of statehood.  The Supreme
Court, after all, has portrayed the protection of individual interests as a pri-
mary point of federalism.168
What is more, the second category of quasi-sovereign interests arguably
folds into the first, with its focus on states’ police powers.  Where some source
of federal law has preempted or otherwise complicated the exercise of such
powers, one could see states as retaining a residual prerogative to ensure the
proper enforcement of that federal law for the purpose of advancing the
health and welfare interests of their citizens.  Indeed, scholars have suggested
similar lines of logic.169  And this would hold whether the federal interven-
are “for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or
community”).
166 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
167 Id. at 608.
168 See Bond v. United States (Bond I), 564 U.S. 211 (2011). Bond I was a (“prudential”)
standing case that presented the question “whether a person indicted for violating a fed-
eral statute has standing to challenge its validity on grounds that, by enacting it, Congress
exceeded its powers under the Constitution, thus intruding upon the sovereignty and
authority of the States.” Id. at 213–14.  The Court said yes, reasoning that “[a]n individual
has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance.” Id. at 222.
Federalism, the Court explained, “is more than an exercise in setting the boundary
between different institutions of government for their own integrity.” Id. at 221.  Instead,
“federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.” Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
169 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2038 (2008) (noting without endorsing the position that where “Congress has disabled
them from asserting regulatory authority in their own right, the states have a sovereign
interest in ensuring that the federal government performs its regulatory responsibilities so
that regulatory gaps are avoided”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1015, 1018, 1073 (2010) (arguing that “[b]y depriving states of their ability to
regulate and leaving a federal regulatory void as well, null preemption infringes upon
states’ sovereignty” and “impedes the ability of states to ensure the health and safety of
their constituents”—and that “[s]tates ought to have greater solicitude [to challenge the
federal government’s failure to regulate] where the federal government has also pre-
empted the states’ freedom to regulate”); see also Grove, supra note 31, at 887–88, 887
n.181 (collecting additional sources supporting this argument).  Grove, however, argues
that while “[s]tates have broad standing to challenge federal statutes and regulations that
preempt, or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of, state law,” they “do not
have a special interest in the manner in which the federal executive enforces federal law.”
Grove, supra note 31, at 855; see also id. at 886–93 (expanding on this argument).
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tion operated in a structural way (such as through constitutional principles,
as in Snapp’s first example of federalism-based quasi-sovereign interests) or in
a more specific way (such as through a benefits-conferring statute, as in
Snapp’s second example of federalism-based quasi-sovereign interests).
Another difference between quasi-sovereign state standing and represen-
tational organizational standing bears addressing here.  In the 1923 case Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon,170 Massachusetts sued the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury
to challenge the Maternity Act of 1921 as unconstitutional for exceeding
Congress’s enumerated powers and transgressing the Tenth Amendment.171
The Maternity Act appropriated federal money to a program that provided
funds to states for purposes related to maternal and infant health, created a
federal agency to administer the program, required that states make reports
as the agency might provide, and allowed the agency to withhold funds if
states failed to comply with their obligations.172  Among other things, Massa-
chusetts alleged that “the rights of its citizens” had been “invaded and
usurped.”173  In today’s parlance, then, the Commonwealth asserted quasi-
sovereign state standing.
The Court rejected this assertion, stating that while “[w]e need not go so
far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens
against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress,” it was
“clear that the right to do so does not arise here.”174  The Court observed
that “the citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United States.”175
And the Court continued by saying that
[i]t cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial
proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of
the statutes thereof.  While the state, under some circumstances, may sue in
that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or
power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal
Government.  In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which
represents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appro-
priate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such
protective measures as flow from that status.176
This is the so-called “Mellon bar” to federal court jurisdiction over suits in
which state plaintiffs seek to challenge federal law.
The scope and strength of the Mellon bar are subjects of perennial
debate,177 but I want to make just two points here.  First, comparing quasi-
170 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
171 See id. at 479.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 485.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 485–86 (citation omitted).
177 E.g., Crocker, supra note 17, at 2070–88 (dissecting one such issue); see Grove, supra
note 31, at 863 & n.60 (noting debate over the Mellon bar); Huq, supra note 90, at 2139–40
(same); Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
209, 225 (2014) (same).
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sovereign state standing to representational organizational standing reveals a
potential (post hoc) justification for the rule.  By saying that “it is no part of”
a state’s “duty or power to enforce [citizens’] rights in respect of their rela-
tionship with the Federal Government,”178 Mellon in effect says that protect-
ing citizens from the operation of federal law is not “germane” to a state’s
“purpose.”179
The second point is that although this potential justification is logical as
a matter of standing doctrine, it is unconvincing as a matter of constitutional
theory.  For one thing, there are good reasons to think that enforcing citi-
zens’ rights in respect of their relationship with the federal government is
germane to a state’s purpose.  For another thing, the Mellon bar essentially
assumes the answer to the question that Massachusetts sought to advance by
suing the Treasury Secretary in the 1920s—and that states often seek to
advance by suing federal-government defendants today.  That is, if “it is the
United States, and not the State, which represents [individuals] as parens
patriae,”180 it is only because federal law is supreme to state law in that partic-
ular area.  But “the Laws of the United States” are only “the supreme Law of
the Land” when they are “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.181  And
that is often the precise issue that states want to litigate in suits where the
Mellon bar becomes an issue, from red-state challenges to Obamacare’s indi-
vidual mandate to blue-state challenges to the Trump administration’s travel
bans.
In short, quasi-sovereign state standing aligns nicely with the second
Hunt factor for representational organizational standing, which says that the
interests an association seeks to protect must be germane to its purpose.  This
factor also provides a plausible but unsuccessful justification for the Mellon
bar against quasi-sovereign suits challenging federal-government action.
3. Individual Participation
The third Hunt factor for representational organizational standing asks
whether “the claim asserted” or “the relief requested” necessitates “the partic-
ipation of individual members in the lawsuit.”182  The Supreme Court has
held that this factor is “prudential” rather than “constitutional.”183  This
means that courts administer it “flexibly,” allowing standing whenever “the
organization can satisfy the functional concerns that might point toward a
need for individual participation.”184
178 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86.
179 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
180 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486.
181 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
182 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
183 United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S.
544, 555 (1996).
184 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.5 (3d
ed. 1999).
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What “functional concerns” might necessitate individual participation in
lawsuits brought by states?  Two stand out.  First, the Supreme Court has
made clear that while “‘individual participation’ is not normally necessary
when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members,”
individual participation is sometimes thought essential in “action[s] for dam-
ages running solely to [an association’s] members.”185  Of course, “many
public suits,” from Tennessee Copper to Hawaii, “seek injunctive relief and
other remedies that are unavoidably aggregate.”186  It stands to reason,
indeed, that a preponderance of representational state-plaintiff cases chal-
lenging federal-government action rather than private conduct pursue
declaratory and injunctive relief rather than monetary remedies.187  But
other representational state suits, like Pennsylvania Railroad, “seek damages
or restitution” and would thus require case-by-case consideration, like similar
organizational-standing suits.188
Second, some courts hold that individual participation is necessary—and
representational organizational standing unavailable—“when conflicts of
interest among members of the association require that the members must
join the suit individually in order to protect their own interests.”189  There
are good reasons to think that state suits suffer from conflicts of interest
more often than one might expect, especially when damages are involved.190
But the same is true for associational suits, and conflicts appear only occa-
sionally to pose roadblocks to standing there.191
185 Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 546.  The key word here is “sometimes.”  In Brown Group
itself, for instance, the Court allowed a union to sue under Hunt “for damages running to
its workers.” Id.
186 Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attor-
neys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 488 (2012).
187 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 512 (“[A]bsent explicit statutory author-
ity, state parens patriae claims generally are limited to actions for injunctive relief.”).
188 Lemos, supra note 186, at 488.  In Pennsylvania Railroad, for reasons having nothing
to do with state standing, the Supreme Court held that Georgia could not recover dam-
ages. See Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 453 (1945) (discussing precedent for the
proposition that “[t]he legal rights of a shipper against a carrier in respect to a rate are to
be measured by the published tariff” because “[i]f a shipper could recover . . . for damages
resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have pre-
vailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over
his trade competitors” (quoting Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
189 Md. Highways Contractors Ass’n v. Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir. 1991).
190 See Lemos, supra note 186, at 512–18.
191 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 184, § 3531.9.5 (stating that while “[s]everal cases
deny organizational standing in such circumstances,” others “have permitted standing after
examination has dispelled the fear of conflict or has persuaded the court that the conflict
would not injure dissenting members”—and that standing “has been recognized not only
when the conflict seems uncertain or slight but also when the conflict seems clear” (foot-
note omitted)).
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Moreover, to the extent that the motivation for this conflicts-related
caveat is “adequacy of representation,”192 the Supreme Court in UAW v.
Brock193 made clear that “[s]hould an association be deficient in this regard,
a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the asso-
ciation’s members without offending due process principles.”194  The same
qualification could presumably apply to states.  And there are compelling
reasons to think that states are as good as, or better than, other associations
at advocating for their constituents.
Consider what the Supreme Court said in Brock.  There, the U.S. Solici-
tor General contended that the Court should discard “the principles of asso-
ciational standing set out in Hunt” and instead require members of
associations to invoke class-action procedures under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 when they wanted to pursue their collective interests as plain-
tiffs in federal court.195
To elaborate, the Solicitor General’s argument went like this: “Rule 23
. . . contains special safeguards to ensure that the diverse interests of class
members are properly represented by the named plaintiff seeking to bring a
case on their behalf.”196  By contrast, “[n]o such adequacy of representation
. . . is guaranteed by” the doctrine of representational organizational stand-
ing.197  Instead, “an association might prove an inadequate representative of
its members’ legal interests for a number of reasons,” including because it
might “lack resources or experience” or might “bring lawsuits without
authorization from its membership.”198  Finally, “the litigation strategy
selected by the association might reflect the views of only a bare majority—or
even an influential minority—of the full membership.”199
The Court rejected this argument for “fail[ing] to recognize the special
features, advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial
system as a whole, that distinguish suits by associations on behalf of their
members from class actions.”200  The Court said that “[w]hile a class action
creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only by their
common claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members
can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital” that can aid
both the association’s constituents and the court system.201  “In addition,”
the Court continued, “the doctrine of associational standing recognizes that
the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective
192 Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 1260, 1265 (3d Cir.
1991).
193 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
194 Id. at 290.
195 Id. at 288.
196 Id. at 288–89.
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vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others.”202  And “[t]he
only practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests,
or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective interests,
often is to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate
the interests of all,” the Court concluded.203
Brock’s reasoning suggests that states are likely to provide advocacy that is
equally effective as—and maybe more effective than—that of other associa-
tions.  States face fewer of the risks that the Solicitor General described.
They are less likely than many other associations to lack the requisite
resources or experience to litigate well.  The rise in the sum, size, and sophis-
tication of solicitor-general offices across the nation has been well docu-
mented, for instance.204  It is important not to understate the conflicts that
officials litigating for states can face, including competing constituent inter-
ests and external political pressures.205  But the democratic accountability
built into their offices’ DNA should temper concern that state officials will
sue without authorization or pursue litigation strategies that fail to represent
their constituents fairly.206  Put differently, “[p]olitical pressure may lead
these state officials to do a better job [than other parties] of representing the
State”—and its citizens—“in court.”207
Moreover, states can claim the same structural advantages toward effec-
tive advocacy that the Supreme Court referenced.  Just as people “pool their
capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will
identify collective interests” when they join private associations, so too do
they “pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and
form that will identify collective interests” when they elect and finance state
governments.
In short, as Lemos and Young have recently argued: “The most obvious,
and important, difference between state and private litigation is that states
are democratic governments.”208  Attorneys general are subject to indepen-
dent election, gubernatorial oversight, and budgetary controls, among other
restraints.209  So there is good reason to believe that they “should be more
accountable to [their] state[s’] citizens than the leaders of an organization
like the Sierra Club are to its members”—and that they should seek to
represent “broader interests than the subset of their citizens directly affected
202 Id. at 290.
203 Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204 See, e.g., Peter Page, State Solicitor General Appointments Open Doors for Appellate Practi-
tioners, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 2008.
205 See Lemos, supra note 186, at 512–18.
206 See Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 113–14.
207 Grove, supra note 31, at 897 (positing as an example that states may “be[ ] moti-
vated to protect their state laws against federal interference because of state public opinion
favoring those laws”).
208 Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 113.
209 Id.
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by a particular lawsuit.”210  All this makes states compare favorably to other
associations when it comes to the competence necessary for effective repre-
sentational litigation.
Someone could argue that this paints too rosy a picture of states’ repre-
sentational capabilities.  As Lemos has explained, among political theorists,
“[t]he standard account of political representation emphasizes three features
that serve to legitimize and democratize representation.”211  First,
“[r]epresentatives must be authorized to act on the people’s behalf.”212  Sec-
ond, “there must be some means by which the people can hold their repre-
sentatives accountable for their actions.”213  Third, “the representatives must
in fact endeavor to advance the people’s interests.”214  One could think that
states reflect these features relatively poorly.  Citizens may be uninformed
about their leaders’ prospective litigation positions, for instance,215 which
could undermine the concept of authorization.  And while public elections
help ensure some accountability, the multifarious nature of an attorney gen-
eral’s work could make elections weak signals of the population’s feelings
about litigation decisions.216  Moreover, the dichotomy and antagonism of
American politics give elections a winner-take-all quality that could raise
doubts about the extent to which the victorious side will subsequently seek to
advance the interests of the vanquished side.217
I tend to be optimistic about states’ representational capabilities.  But
taking competing views into account, what matters is that there are strong
reasons to think that states and associations on the whole can represent at
least many of their constituents’ interests in at least many instances at least
relatively well.
Examining all three Hunt factors suggests that the heartland of quasi-
sovereign state standing corresponds comfortably to the framework for repre-
sentational organizational standing.  Indeed, for all the reasons explored
above, the same holds true about the heartland of state standing and the
framework for organizational standing more broadly.  The legal community,
therefore, should embrace the former at least to the same extent as the
latter.
210 Id. at 113–14.
211 Margaret H. Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1743, 1743 (2017).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1743–44.
214 Id. at 1744.
215 See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence for the
Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 980 (2017).
216 See id. at 980–81.
217 See Lemos & Young, supra note 2, at 114–15; see also Huq, supra note 90, at 2151
(discussing “whether changes to the availability of state standing will lead to changes in the
manner in which an issue is litigated as it moves from state to private hands”).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has surveyed the underexplored relationship between state
standing and organizational standing.  The doctrines exhibit significant con-
gruence, with each available in two direct forms and one indirect form.  As
for the direct forms, proprietary state standing essentially matches economic
organizational standing, and sovereign state standing essentially matches mis-
sional organizational standing.  As for the indirect forms, quasi-sovereign
state standing finds a close counterpart in representational organizational
standing.  At bottom, one can view these genres of aggregate-litigant standing
as peas in a pod or even as one and the same.
Either way, the connections between state standing and organizational
standing call into question the widespread skepticism over the former.  And a
comparative view of states and other associations as representational litigants
provides further support for state standing.  In light of states’ characteristics,
constitutional role, and competence, they should be able to assert standing
to sue in federal court—and especially against federal-government defend-
ants—at least to the same extent that other associations can.  Regardless of
whether states are “entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing analysis”
(to quote a controversial line from the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts deci-
sion in 2007),218 there are good reasons to think that they may not often
need it.
218 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
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